Violence-Related Costs and Disclosure: Why Are Some Firms Unwilling to Disclose Executive’s Compensation?

摘要: We investigate a scenario in which some firms explicitly deny to disclose information about executive compensation alleging potential safety concerns for their top executives and their families. We directly observe firms that explicitly withhold information after filling a court injunction. We use probit and instrumental variable probit models in which the use of injunction is the dependent variable and total robbery rates as proxy for managers’ disclosure costs. After controlling for firms' characteristics, we find that total robbery rate is positively associated with the use of injunction. The marginal effect at means shows that an increase of 1% in the total robbery rate increases the probability of the firm to file for a preliminary court injunction by about 0.24 pp Additionally our results show the ex-post consequences of non-compliance to executives compensation disclosure rules. Firms that use the preliminary court injunction to …