摘要: Richard Posner has spent several decades on a quest for his Holy Grail, that is, a less controversial and more persuasive account of an earlier doctrine that economic efficiency ought to dictate how judges decide legal cases. 1 In one of his scholarly adventures, a book entitled Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, the Justice of the US Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals wrestles with the ghost of John Dewey for the mantle of pragmatist jurisprudence, or the coveted title “steward of pragmatism in the law.” 2 Most commentators have seen this work as pitting Posner against Dewey in a contest of pragmatisms, the stakes for which are no less than their respective legacies for legal and democratic theory. 3 Some have sided with Posner and others with Dewey. I contend that the commentaries have misidentified the target of Posner’s critique. Posner had another legal
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