The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints

摘要: In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the alpha-core equal to beta-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function continuous concave (Zhao 1999b). Following Chander Tulkens (1997), we assume firms react a deviating coalition by choosing best reply strategies. We deal with problem of non-emptiness induced core, gamma-core, two different approaches. The first establishes associated TU(Transferable Utility)-games balanced inverse demand differentiable on set strategy profiles, which step forward beyond Zhao's core existence result for this class games. second approach, restricted TU-games linear cost functions, provides single-valued allocation rule in gamma-core called NP(Nash Pro rata)-value. This generalizes Funaki Yamato's (1999) from no capacity constraint asymmetric constraints. Moreover, provide an axiomatic characterization solution means four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity non-cooperative fairness.