Cournot oligopoly interval games

摘要: In this paper we consider cooperative Cournot oligopoly games. Following Chander and Tulkens (1997) assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. Lardon (2009) shows if the inverse demand function is not dierentiable, it always possible define TU(Transferable Utility)-game. paper, prove can specify interval game. Furthermore, deal with problem of non-emptiness two induced cores: -core standard -core. To end, use decision theory criterion, Hurwicz criterion (Hurwicz 1951), consists in combining, for any coalition, worst better worths obtain its worth interval. The first result states non-empty only TU-game associated every admits However, show even very simple situation, condition fails be satisfied. second nonempty Moreover, give some properties on profit cost under which holds, what substantially extends existence results (2009).