Cooperation under Interval Uncertainty

作者: Sirma Zeynep Alparslan-Gok , Sylvia Miquel , Stef H. Tijs

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1096056

关键词: Classical theoryValue (mathematics)SuperadditivityMathematical economicsMathematicsInterval (mathematics)Bondareva–Shapley theoremCooperative game theoryCore (game theory)

摘要: In this paper, the classical theory of two-person cooperative games is extended to with interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions introduced characterizations given.

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