Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games: characterization of the core and 1-concavity of the dual game

摘要: In this article we consider Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form (Chander and Tulkens 1997) which any deviating coalition produces an output at a first period as leader outsiders simultaneously independently play quantity second followers. We assume that the inverse demand is linear firms operate constant but possibly distinct marginal costs. Generally speaking, for TU-game show 1-concavity property of its dual game necessary sufficient condition under core initial non-empty coincides with set imputations. The great interest since it describes contribution followers to join grand by turning leaders. aim provide ensures satisfies property. Moreover, prove depends on heterogeneity firms' costs, i.e., 1-concave if only costs are not too heterogeneous. This last result extends Marini Currarini's non-emptiness (2003) situations.