No, one should not believe all truths
DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1610054
关键词: Norm (group) 、 If and only if 、 Philosophy 、 Epistemology 、 Doxastic logic
摘要: In a recent paper, Alexander Greenberg defends truth norm of belief according to which if one has some doxastic attitude towards p, ought believe that p and only is true (da). He r...
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