Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information

作者: Sarit Kraus , Onn Shehory , Gilad Taase

DOI: 10.1145/860575.860577

关键词: Service providerComplete informationProtocol (object-oriented programming)Task (project management)Computer scienceHeuristicsComputer securityStochastic gameRequest for proposalCommon knowledgeDistributed computing

摘要: Coalition formation methods allow agents to join together and are thus necessary in cases where tasks can only be performed cooperatively by groups. This is the case Request For Proposal (RFP) domain, some requester business agent issues an RFP - a complex task comprised of sub-tasks several service provider need address this RFP. In such environments value may common knowledge, however costs that incurs for performing specific sub-task unknown other agents. Additionally, time addressing RFPs limited. These constraints make it hard apply traditional coalition mechanisms, since those assume complete information, lesser significance there.To problem, we have developed protocol enables negotiate form coalitions, provide them with simple heuristics choosing partners. The coalitions face incomplete information. overall payoff using our very close experimentally measured optimal value, as extensive experimental evaluation shows.

参考文章(11)
Tuomas W. Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser, Coalition formation among bounded rational agents international joint conference on artificial intelligence. pp. 662- 669 ,(1995)
Onn Shehory, Sarit Kraus, Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation Artificial Intelligence. ,vol. 101, pp. 165- 200 ,(1998) , 10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00045-9
Onn Shehory, Sarit Kraus, Feasible Formation of Coalitions Among Autonomous Agents in Nonsuperadditive Environments computational intelligence. ,vol. 15, pp. 218- 251 ,(1999) , 10.1111/0824-7935.00092
Morton Davis, Michael Maschler, The kernel of a cooperative game Naval Research Logistics Quarterly. ,vol. 12, pp. 223- 259 ,(1965) , 10.1002/NAV.3800120303
Rajiv Vohra, Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 86, pp. 123- 147 ,(1999) , 10.1006/JETH.1999.2512
Tuomas W. Sandhlom, Victor R.T Lesser, Coalitions among computationally bounded agents Artificial Intelligence. ,vol. 94, pp. 99- 137 ,(1997) , 10.1016/S0004-3702(97)00030-1
Milan Mareš, Fuzzy coalition structures Fuzzy Sets and Systems. ,vol. 114, pp. 23- 33 ,(2000) , 10.1016/S0165-0114(98)00006-2
Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé, Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees Artificial Intelligence. ,vol. 111, pp. 209- 238 ,(1999) , 10.1016/S0004-3702(99)00036-3