摘要: … feasible contracts, we assume that agents can communicate freely. In many cases, allowing for self-enforcing communication of information significantly enlarges the set of contracts that …
core.ac.uk
elsevier.com
sci-hub.se 参考文章(34)
Beth Allen, 4. Market Games with Asymmetric Information : Verification and the Publicly Predictable Information Core Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics. ,vol. 34, pp. 101- 122 ,(1993) , 10.15057/7782
Nicholas C. Yannelis, The core of an economy with differential information Economic Theory. ,vol. 1, pp. 73- 86 ,(1991) , 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_4
Roger B Myerson, Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems Journal of Mathematical Economics. ,vol. 10, pp. 67- 81 ,(1982) , 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
Faruk Gul, Andrew Postlewaite, Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information Econometrica. ,vol. 60, pp. 1273- 1292 ,(1992) , 10.2307/2951522
Bengt Holmstrom, Roger B. Myerson, EFFICIENT AND DURABLE DECISION RULES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION Econometrica. ,vol. 51, pp. 1799- 1819 ,(1983) , 10.2307/1912117
Marcus Berliant, On income taxation and the core Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 56, pp. 121- 141 ,(1992) , 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90072-P
Vincent P. Crawford, Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation Econometrica. ,vol. 53, pp. 817- 835 ,(1985) , 10.2307/1912656
Françoise Forges, A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies Economics Letters. ,vol. 46, pp. 27- 31 ,(1994) , 10.1016/0165-1765(94)90073-6
Robert Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy Studies in Economic Theory. ,vol. 46, pp. 55- 64 ,(1978) , 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_2
Paul Milgrom, Nancy Stokey, Information, trade and common knowledge Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 26, pp. 17- 27 ,(1982) , 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1