4. Market Games with Asymmetric Information : Verification and the Publicly Predictable Information Core
作者： Beth Allen
DOI: 10.15057/7782
关键词: Net (mathematics) 、 Private information retrieval 、 Microeconomics 、 Class (computer programming) 、 Information asymmetry 、 Ex-ante 、 Core (game theory) 、 Computer science 、 Information sharing
摘要: For cooperative (NTU) games generated by finite exchange economies with asymmetric information about comrnon payoff-relevant states of the world, private use is equivalent to publicly predictable sharing rule. ~ This leads balanced which therefore have nonempty cores as well Nash verifiability a coalition member's ex ante cdntingent net trades. Conditions yielding and strong for more general rules are also provided. In this way, class market partial commitment that classified between noncooperative can be studied.
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