Rent Seeking and Political Institutions

摘要: Gordon Tullock’s (1967) analysis of “The Welfare Costs Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft” revealed that these outcomes are more inefficient than implied by traditional welfare economics, because individuals use scarce resources to secure undesirable outcomes. To tariffs, devoted domestic firms who may profit from trade protection, avoid them, those expect be harmed import duties. Obtaining monopoly power often requires similar investments government-enforced entry barriers. In the case crime, aim rent seekers avoiders is not influence government policy, but involves a sort conflict. Criminals invest redistribute owners themselves in locks guns foil efforts potential criminals. Tullock points out total output valuable goods services necessarily smaller would have been if had used produce new consumer rather wasted games leading Static economics under measured losses generated monopoly, theft focusing attention on final outcome neglecting processes which were (Posner, 1975).