The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory
作者： Jack Hirshleifer
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摘要: Introduction 1. The dark side of the force Part I. Causes, Consequences and Conduct Conflict: 2. bioeconomic causes war 3. paradox power 4. Do rich get richer poor poorer? Experimental tests a model 5. Conflict rent-seeking success functions: ration vs. difference models relative 6. Anarchy its breakdown 7. Truth, effort, legal battle 8. Are equilibrium strategies unaffected by incentives? II. Evolutionary Approaches to Resolution: 9. Extract from evolutionary in economics law: cooperation versus conflict 10. On emotions as guarantors threats promises 11. What can support emergence cooperation? 12. Selection, mutation, preservation diversity games 13. There are many pathways 14. expanding domain economics.
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