Frictions in the CEO Labor Market: The Role of Talent Agents in CEO Compensation*
作者： Shivaram Rajgopal , Daniel Taylor , Mohan Venkatachalam
DOI: 10.1111/J.1911-3846.2011.01082.X
关键词: Economic rent 、 Reservation wage 、 Shareholder 、 Intermediary 、 Economics 、 Corporate governance 、 Labour economics 、 Quality (business) 、 Stock (geology) 、 Executive compensation 、 Accounting
摘要: Standard principal-agent models commonly invoked to explain executive pay practices do not account for the involvement of third-party intermediaries in CEO labor market. This paper investigates influence one such intermediary – talent agents who seek out prospective employers and negotiate packages on behalf CEOs. Jensen, Murphy Wruck (2004) characterize hiring as an obvious example rent extraction by incoming After controlling economic factors, proxies governance quality, determinants CEO’s reservation wage, first year compensation CEOs use these is significantly higher about $10 million relative agents. Further analysis suggests that firms run report superior future operating stock performance, suggesting are extracting rents at expense shareholders.
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