Economic Characteristics, Corporate Governance, and the Influence of Compensation Consultants on Executive Pay Levels
作者： Chris S. Armstrong , Christopher D. Ittner , David F. Larcker
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1145548
关键词:
摘要: This study investigates the relation between use of compensation consultants and CEO pay levels. Using new proxy statement disclosures from 2,116 companies, we examine claims that is higher in clients consultants, test whether any differences users non-users are due to economic or corporate governance characteristics. We find generally most consulting firms, even after controlling for determinants compensation. However, when matched on both characteristics, levels not statistically significant. These results consistent with provide a mechanism CEOs companies weak extract justify excess pay. Finally, no support conflicted also offer additional non-compensation related services.
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