Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence
作者： Richard M. Cyert , Sok-Hyon Kang , Praveen Kumar
DOI: 10.1287/MNSC.48.4.453.205
关键词:
摘要: We examine, both theoretically and empirically, top-management compensation in the presence of agency conflicts when shareholders have delegated governance responsibilities to a self-interested Board of Directors (BOD). We develop a theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates the BOD as a strategic player, models the negotiation process between the CEO and the BOD in designing CEO compensation, and considers the impact of potential takeovers by large shareholders monitoring the CEO-BOD negotiations …
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