Determinacy and Rational Choice

作者: Russell Hardin

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_12

关键词: Stochastic gamePrimitive notionMathematical economicsDeterminacyMathematicsStructure (mathematical logic)Rational choice theoryContext (language use)

摘要: Suppose we have a fully determinate rational choice theory that will tell each of us what to do in particular interactive context and suppose knows the positions all others. From our I can calculate not only ought but also other agent interaction rationally do. Given knowledge should do, check whether could fact better by following theory. If yields solutions, sense it tells explicitly these solutions must be equilibrium for players who full payoff structure, this theory, assume their co-players are

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