Approaches to the Bargaining Problem before and after the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s Theories

摘要: It is proposed1 to show that Professor Zeuthen’s solution of the bargaining problem2 (antedating von Neumann-Morgenstern theory games3 by more than a decade) mathematically equivalent Mr. Nash’s solution4 (based on games), except Zeuthen regards two parties’ mutual threats as given while Nash furnishes also for problem selecting optimal threats. At same time, it will be submitted approach in turn supplements abstract treatment an important way supplying plausible psychological model actual process. However, certain minor changes basic postulates and simplication method finding suggested. Comparing with Hicks’ collective bargaining5 (published shortly after Zeuthen’s), argued former rests assumptions both realistic consistent postulate rational behaviour. Finally, economic significance Zeuthen-Nash discussed.