Game-Theoretic Remarks on Gibbard's Libertarian Social Choice Functions
作者： Roy Gardner
DOI:
关键词: Liberal paradox 、 Epistemology 、 Psychology 、 Social choice theory 、 Game theoretic 、 Social psychology 、 Function (engineering)
摘要: Gibbard [4) has recently introduced a Pareto-consistent libertarian claim, designed to explicate Sen's Liberal Paradox [9]. The question this paper asks is whether all—or any—social choice functions satisfying Gibbard's claim are worthily of approval. This argues that there unique such social function.
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