Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments

作者: Bezalel Peleg

DOI: 10.1007/BF02759717

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摘要: In this paper an analogue of the bargaining setM 1 i is defined for cooperative games without side payments. An existence theorem proved pairs, while it shown by example that no general holds.

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