CEO reputation and stock-based compensation $
作者： Todd T. Milbourn
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00066-7
关键词: Accounting 、 Liberian dollar 、 Shareholder 、 Executive compensation 、 Reputation 、 Stock (geology) 、 Monetary economics 、 Business
摘要: I develop a theory of stock-based compensation contracts for the chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms and confront the theoretical predictions with recent CEO compensation data. The model characterizes the optimal contract for a CEO whose reputation evolves as signals of the executive's ability are observed by shareholders. Using various proxies for CEO reputation, I show a positive and economically meaningful relationship between stock-based pay-sensitivities and CEO reputation. The findings are robust to controls for CEO age, firm …
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