Disclosure and compliance: The 'pillory' as an innovative regulatory instrument

摘要: Enforcement agencies increasingly use disclosure as a regulatory instrument to promote compliance and govern societal risks: data about companies are disclosed expose their level of compliance. This innovative instrument, called the 'pillory', differs from traditional instruments such financial incentives ('the carrot'), legal sanctions stick') government communication sermon'). The 'pillory' aims inform activate stakeholder environments and, in so doing, encourage them push for better Based on case studies National Veterinary Food Administration, British Environment Agency Dutch Provincial Environmental Inspectorate, this article attempts determine conditions under which Internet-mediated contributes moderation risks. It is concluded that inspectees (businesses, supervised organizations) sensitive reputational damage even though they seldom confronted with visible actions stakeholders. Disclosure affects behavior 'small offenders', who care reputations, more than 'large only react harsh measures. useful serious offenders still need be punished 'the stick'. In reflection, we argue rise can attributed availability technology changing role network society.