作者: Caroline Kudla , Kenneth G. Paterson
DOI: 10.1007/11593447_30
关键词: Modular design 、 Forward secrecy 、 Oracle 、 Computer security model 、 Public-key cryptography 、 Random oracle 、 Computer security 、 Theoretical computer science 、 Computer science 、 Mathematical proof 、 Key (cryptography)
摘要: The security of key agreement protocols has traditionally been notoriously hard to establish. In this paper we present a modular approach the construction proofs for large class protocols. By following proof construction, hope enable simpler and less error-prone analysis generation such technique is compatible with Bellare-Rogaway style models as well more recent Bellare et al. Canetti Krawczyk. particular, show how use decisional oracle can aid these commonly reduces some form Gap assumption.