作者: Özgür Dagdelen , Marc Fischlin , Tommaso Gagliardoni , Giorgia Azzurra Marson , Arno Mittelbach
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40203-6_20
关键词:
摘要: We take a closer look at the Open Protocol for Access Control, Identification, and Ticketing with privacY (OPACITY). This Diffie-Hellman-based protocol is supposed to provide secure privacy-friendly key establishment contactless environments. It promoted by US Department of Defense meanwhile available in several standards such as ISO/IEC 24727-6 ANSI 504-1. To best our knowledge, so far no detailed cryptographic analysis has been publicly available. Thus, we investigate how common security properties authenticated exchange impersonation resistance, well privacy-related like untraceability deniability, are met.