Uncertainty in Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements

作者: Charles D. Kolstad

DOI:

关键词: Standard model (cryptography)Cost–benefit analysisEnvironmental economicsControl (management)Transboundary pollutionPolitical scienceEnvironmental planning

摘要: This paper addresses the subject of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEA’s). These are voluntary to control transboundary pollution among cooperating countries. The standard model IEA’s is adapted include uncertainty in costs and benefits, as well learning about these benefits. investigates extent which size coalition changes a result uncertainty.

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