A simple dynamic model of international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant
作者： S. Rubio , A. Ulph
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参考文章(5)
A. Ulph, S. Rubio, Leadership and self-enforcing international environmental agreements with non-negative emissions Research Papers in Economics. ,(2002)
Johan Eyckmans, Michael Finus, New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. ,vol. 7, pp. 391- 414 ,(2006) , 10.1007/BF03353948
JOHAN EYCKMANS, MICHAEL FINUS, Coalition formation in a global warming game: how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making Natural Resource Modeling. ,vol. 19, pp. 323- 358 ,(2008) , 10.1111/J.1939-7445.2006.TB00184.X
Michael Finus, Bianca Rundshagen, Nota Di Lavoro, How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements Research Papers in Economics. ,(2003)
Santiago J. Rubio, Alistair Ulph, An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. ,vol. 54, pp. 296- 310 ,(2007) , 10.1016/J.JEEM.2007.02.004