Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy

作者: Sophie Thoyer , Gordon C. Rausser , Sylvie Morardet , Rachael E. Goodhue , Leo K. Simon

DOI: 10.22004/AG.ECON.37630

关键词: Process (engineering)Power (social and political)HarmEconomic systemPoliticsPolitical economyRedistribution (cultural anthropology)Political scienceNegotiationDistribution (economics)Stakeholder

摘要: Stakeholder negotiation is an increasingly important policymaking tool. However, relatively little understood about the relationship between structure of negotiating process and effectiveness with which stakeholders can pursue their individual interests. We apply Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model to a specific involving water storage capacity use in upper Adour Basin southwestern France. focus on coalition three stakeholder groups aligned but distinct In addition standard indices power-the distribution political weights ( access ) players' utilities if agreement not reached, our analysis identifi es other less obvious sources power. First, member may benefit when his reduced redistribution increases another who has more favorable strategic location. Second, interests as whole will usually, always, be advanced its members cede spokesman representing common some adversely affected. Third, restricting extent make proposals that further own at expense harm whole.

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