作者: John B. Gilmour , Paul Rothstein
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1812-2_10
关键词: Term (time) 、 Representation (politics) 、 Law and economics 、 Balance (accounting) 、 Legislature 、 Economics 、 Ballot 、 Limit (mathematics) 、 Macroeconomics 、 Loss rate
摘要: In November 1992, voters in fourteen states considered ballot propositions to adopt term limits for members of Congress. All passed (ten received more than 60% support), bringing the total number with congressional fifteen. Much discussion limitation has focused on issues representation, strength parties, and functioning Congress after adoption (Benjamin Malbin, 1992), (Will, 1992). This paper explores an important but less discussed consequence limitation, its impact partisan balance legislatures. We inquire how electoral dynamics, incumbent advantage, voluntary retirement interact a limit produce new between parties two-party legislature. Which party is favored by introduction limits? How does length matter? Are there conditions such that one will be any limit, regardless restrictive?