Combinatorial and Simultaneous Auction : A Pragmatic Approach to Tighter Bounds on Expected Revenue

作者: Jim Wilenius

DOI:

关键词: RevenueEconomicsMicroeconomicsCombinatorial auctionWork (electrical)

摘要: It is a common belief that combinatorial auctions provide good solutions to resource-allocation in multiple-object markets with synergies. In this work we adopt pragmatic approach examining th ...

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