A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies
作者： Gian Luigi Albano , Fabrizio Germano , Stefano Lovo
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00394-3
关键词:
摘要: In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria a simultaneous ascending auction compare revenue efficiency generated ones by sequential, one-shot simultaneous, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.
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