Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
作者： Gian Luigi Albano , Fabrizio Germano , Stefano Lovo
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-005-0634-5
关键词: English auction 、 Forward auction 、 Japanese auction 、 Revenue equivalence 、 Multiunit auction 、 Mathematical economics 、 Auction theory 、 Microeconomics 、 Economics 、 Vickrey auction 、 Reverse auction 、 Economics and Econometrics
摘要: We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects, namely, an English and a Japanese auction, derive perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the auction by exploiting its strategic equivalence with survival which consists finite sequence sealed-bid auctions. Thus continuous time game is derived means backward induction in finitely many steps. then show that all equilibria induce but collusive or signaling do not have counterpart auction.
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