Naive use of environmental instruments

作者: Udo Ebert

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8642-9_3

关键词: ExternalityPerfect competitionMarket structureCertaintyMarginal abatement costComplete informationEconomicsDamagesMicroeconomicsOptimal tax

摘要: Evaluation and comparison of environmental instruments their performance are central issues in economics. Under conditions certainty, complete information, perfect competition, Pigouvian taxes standards equivalent. Furthermore, the optimal tax should be equal to marginal damage. Of course this solution problem internalizing externalities is too simple if confronted with reality. Rather quickly economists realized that policy much more complicated when theory translated into measures (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman (1973)). There a lot reasons why different have impacts, certain allocations cannot attained, or one instrument used another not. The equivalence gets lost whenever, e.g., there many polluters, location polluters has taken account. Other obstacles market imperfections strategic behavior firms. regulator often not able gather observe information necessary for reasonable policy. lack concerns possibilities firms (cost function, abatement technology etc.). Furthermore it relevant, whether any monitoring actions can really enforced. decision maker also fully informed about resulting damages evaluation. All these problems implications investigated.

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