Why Are Some Public Officials more Corrupt Than Others?

作者: Jennifer Hunt

DOI: 10.3386/W11595

关键词: BusinessCorruptionAccountingPublic officialService (business)Corporate governanceInstitutionPublic institution

摘要: Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. distinguish between the bribery rate size bribes received, seek to explain variation in each across institutions. The characteristics officials' clients for rates, but none bribe amounts. A measure speed honest service at institution explains much remaining both rates results indicate that is higher institutions with bribe-prone clients, amounts where frustrated slow service. Faster better would reduce corruption. Overall, judiciary police by far

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