Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference

作者: Graham Priest

DOI: 10.1215/00294527-2010-005

关键词: Paraconsistent logicSelf-referenceVaguenessPhilosophyRest (physics)Sorites paradoxEpistemology

摘要: In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes of self-reference. Given and self-referential of the same kind, should have same kind solution. The rest paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to is like, connections with paradoxes, and related issues—especially so called "higher order" vagueness.

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