Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered

作者: Patrick W. Schmitz

DOI: 10.1628/0015221012904869

关键词: Incomplete contractsProperty rightsScope (project management)BusinessQuality (business)Public ownershipIncentiveTransaction costMicroeconomicsGovernment

摘要: In this paper it is argued that privatization not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopting incomplete contract approach, shown partial may well be optimal ownership structure. While in standard model joint usually dominated, here form of can since mitigates disadvantages (no incentives improve quality if manager invests or too strong government invests) and (too for reduce costs).

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