作者: Hanna Kokko , Andrés López‐Sepulcre , Lesley J. Morrell
DOI: 10.1086/504604
关键词: Economics 、 Value (ethics) 、 Conflict resolution 、 Evolutionary game theory 、 Territoriality 、 Power (social and political) 、 Population 、 Microeconomics 、 Ecology 、 Game theory 、 Selection (linguistics)
摘要: Abstract: Explaining the “prior‐residence effect” (automatic owner status of individuals who arrived first in an area) was one very applications game theory animal behavior. These models, however, predict paradoxical solutions where intruders always win, with no satisfactory explanation for absence such cases nature. We propose a solution based on new developments evolutionary theory. A self‐consistent model feedbacks between individual behavior and population dynamics produces qualitatively different frequency‐dependent selection (floaters) than territory owners. Starting ancestral respect ownership, most likely end point is complete or partial respect. Conventional rules conflict resolution thus can rely “uncorrelated asymmetries” without differences resource‐holding power value, although they will be strengthened by differences. also review empirical literature ...