Informational Rents and Property Rights in Land

摘要: The institution of sharecropping tenancy and its inefficiency has long fascinated development economists, especially following the famous footnotes on subject in Marshall (1920).1 tendency for a landlord to appropriate fraction crop tilled by tenant, interlink contract with monopoly provision credit, appears many people be ‘semi-feudal’ character, inducing low levels agricultural productivity. This orthodoxy been challenged last two or three decades number conceptual grounds, critique Marshallian argument Cheung (1969). Sharecropping is viewed as providing reasonable compromise between need wealthy share risks poor provide incentives latter apply effort (Stiglitz, 1974; Newbery, 1977; Bell, 1989; Singh, 1989). Interlinking credit contracts an efficient response problem moral hazard part avoid externalities landlords creditors (Braverman Stiglitz, 1982;