Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining

作者: Rohan Pitchford

DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00141-4

关键词:

摘要: Abstract I examine the standard assumption in moral hazard agency literature that principal has all bargaining power at contract offer stage. When agent limited liability, as is often case practice, changes according to distribution of power, and consequently so does agents effort. Implications this result are examined.

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