How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment
作者： Tracy R Lewis , David E. M Sappington
DOI: 10.1257/AER.91.3.724
关键词: Environmental law 、 Microeconomics 、 Environmental risk 、 Economics 、 Equity (finance) 、 Liability 、 Actuarial science
摘要: Recently, U.S. environmental law has shown a tendency toward increased lender liability. A model of potentially judgment-proof owner firm, lender, and potential victim is developed in which this policy can increase accident frequency reduce efficiency. Full, partial, zero lender-liability rules minimum equity requirement are analyzed. Partial liability an equivalent deliver the highest level efficiency, although former higher contribution by to than latter. Policy empirical implications also discussed. Copyright 1995 American Economic Association.
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