Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence

作者: James M. Walker , Roy Gardner , Elinor Ostrom

DOI: 10.1016/0095-0696(90)90069-B

关键词: Theoretical modelsAccrualEconomicsEconomic rentCommon-pool resourceExperimental methodsAppropriationMicroeconomicsInvested capitalLimited access

摘要: Abstract This paper examines group behavior in an experimental environment designed to parallel the conditions specified noncooperative models of limited-access common-pool resources. Using methods, we investigate strength theoretical which predict that users such resources will appropriate units at a rate marginal returns from appropriation are greater than costs. Our results confirm prediction suboptimal accrual rents and offer evidence on effects increasing investment capital available appropriators.

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