作者: Richard Cornes , Todd Sandler
DOI:
关键词: Public economics 、 Economics 、 Externality 、 Nash equilibrium 、 Microeconomics 、 Public good 、 Public choice 、 Coase theorem 、 Club good 、 Applied economics 、 Information asymmetry
摘要: This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates expands the discussion their implications, coverage asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, intuitive graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates graduate students making serious foray into this branch economics, analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advances in field. No other single source for range materials explored is currently available. Topics investigated include Nash equilibrium, Lindahl equilibria, theory, preference-revelation mechanism, Pigouvian taxes, commons, Coase Theorem, static repeated games. authors use mathematical techniques only as much necessary pursue economic argument. They develop key principles economics that are useful subfields such choice, labor growth, international environmental natural resource industrial organization.