作者: Camilo Gomez , Diego Castiblanco , Mauricio Sanchez-Silva , Leonardo Duenas-Osorio
DOI: 10.1109/COGSIMA.2012.6188387
关键词: Action (philosophy) 、 Risk management 、 Computer science 、 Incentive 、 Risk analysis 、 Variety (cybernetics) 、 Game theory 、 Management science 、 Maintenance engineering 、 Public infrastructure
摘要: A holistic approach for engineering problems involving public infrastructure implies considering a series of actors and interactions that must not be neglected nor considered in isolation. This paper seeks to incorporate the relationship between decision-makers private providers into traditional technical problems, such as making decisions about maintenance risk mitigation. Conceptual computational aspects are discussed with regards two complementary approaches multi-party nature decision-making problem. First, game theoretical is used model basic example private-public-partnership operation, where use incentives from perspective agent influence agent's behavior. Second, an optimization evaluate action several stakeholders problem executing on simplified transportation network. The current state this research provides framework means define variety (even adversarial) strategies outcomes emerge coupling different interests decisions.