Constraining the Statutory President

摘要: When agencies make decisions that are binding on the public, they must provide public notice, accept and consider comments, explanations for their final decisions. Their actions then subject to judicial review ensure acted within scope of authority decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The President, however, is such constraints, even when exercising purely statutory authority, i.e., acting as “Statutory President.” That autonomy due Supreme Court’s holding in Franklin v. Massachusetts President an “agency” under Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Thanks Franklin, exercises delegated policy have enormous implications without involvement, transparency, deliberation, political accountability we demand This article first take head on. It demonstrates 1992 conflicts with plain language history APA; it explains flaws constitutional analysis; presents normative case treating Statutory like any other agency. Having shown wrong, this sketches a new model APA. concludes by explaining how both process outcome Trump Hawaii, which Court upheld President’s order barring immigration from certain Muslim-majority nations, would been different had