摘要: This article begins with the descriptive claim that much of administrative law is really common law: doctrines and requirements are largely judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, President, or individual agencies. To be sure, governing statutes exert some constraining force on judicial creativity, but primary basis these judge-fashioned lies in conceptions appropriate institutional roles, along pragmatic normative concerns, frequently constitutionally infused developed incrementally through precedent. Yet created character rarely acknowledged courts - extent do acknowledge development law, they usually condemn practice.Turning from more normative, argues for explicit recognition acceptance law. Administrative serves an important function our separation powers system, a system makes it difficult Congress President oust developers In particular, features role plays structuring relationships between different government institutions imposes how agencies operate create strong pressures play lawmaking role. Moreover, have employed central mechanism which ameliorate constitutional tensions raised modern state. These combine make inevitable. At same time, represents legitimate instance lawmaking. The very factors support federal other instances unique interests at stake, need uniformity, impropriety relying state dominate contexts. Much also has statutory least loosely tethered, embodies core values. As important, openly acknowledging critical clarifying improving