Performance Pay: Trends and Consequences Introduction:

作者: Keith A. Bender , Alex Bryson

DOI: 10.1177/002795011322600101

关键词: Compensation (psychology)Public economicsLabour economicsMarginal productProductivityPay for performanceEconomicsIncentiveResearch questionsHigh productivityPerformance pay

摘要: From First Principles, one of the key implications standard labour economic theory is that workers should be paid their marginal product. Pay tied to a worker’s performance, therefore, would seem provide most direct link satisfy this theoretical requirement (Lazear, 1986). Indeed, there ample evidence indicates implementing pay for performance increases productivity through combination increased incentives high and highly productive sort themselves into these types jobs (e.g., Lazear, 2000; Haley, 2003; Gielen et al., 2010; Jones 2010 Bryson 2013). Because potentially beneficial attributes performance-related pay, much research has been devoted identifying how widespread practice compared with other methods compensation, it changed over time, viewed by different market actors whether correlates (positively or negatively) outcomes, as well host questions.

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