作者: Robert R Raffety
DOI:
关键词: Engineering 、 Natural resource economics 、 Operating partner 、 Corporation 、 Hazardous waste 、 Collective action 、 Externality 、 Operations management 、 Empirical evidence 、 Harm 、 Government
摘要: In August 2011, ConocoPhillips was blamed for an oil spill off of China’s coast in the Bohai Sea. ConocoPhillips, minority operating partner a 51%-49% joint-venture (JV) with China National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC), immediately notified Chinese government about spill, but clean-up operations were delayed weeks. defending their efforts, explained that prevented them from containing timely manner. This incident, and especially division interest blame among two partners, highlights difficulty coordinating collective action environmental objectives within JVs. This dissertation examines whether, when, why divided corporate ownership affects performance. I focus on hazardous industrial waste known to adversely impact human health draw attention health-related consequences JV’s outcomes. In first essay, ask whether when influences facilities’ emissions control waste. further explore JV facilities take greater precautions has perceivably worse human-health by contrasting cancerous non-cancerous (yet hazardous) byproducts. find robust empirical evidence joint venture emit far more than independently owned peers, owners can do align behaviors address what are perceived as most detrimental hazards (cancerous byproducts). In second closer examination co-owned mechanisms which recycling treatment examine dispersion, partner-type effects, coalition heterogeneity each these characteristics contribute variance pollution measures. dispersion contributes mitigation through However, polarizes based upon contestable harm, undermining over yet byproducts encouraging substances. Overall, this demonstrates co-ownership detracts performance broadens theoretical accounts ownership’s nuanced social sensitivity externalities.