Domestic Constraints Tactics in the Council of the EU

摘要: Do domestic constraints lead to bargaining power in the Council of EU? In Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, he argued with support from Thomas Schelling’s theory on paradox weakness, that can be a source when states negotiate internationally. Their argument is negotiators, by claiming constraints, force adversaries make concessions order reach agreement. Initially designed for purely intergovernmental negotiations, bounds applicability theories have been sought also EU. This research has concluded do not result success EU Council. paper questions previous two main points thereby contributing developing theory. First, sufficiently focused whether negotiators actually communicate their which prerequisite it effective. Secondly, studies adapt fact decision-making does contain formal ratification and veto actors as such challenge The identified shortcomings are addressed focusing (1) communication (2) theoretical adaptation identify other modes interactions focus less threats defection more how used according logics mechanisms. New survey data presented test communicated complemented qualitative interviews addressing question used. was conducted 249 respondents all 27 member working preparatory bodies over variety policy areas were done state attaches Empirically, indicated indeed but than threats. Explanations variation patterns looking at differences between areas. Work progress! Paper prepared 13 th European Union Studies Association biennial conference,