The Political Economy of Policy Instrument Choice: Theory and Evidence from Agricultural Policies

作者: Johan F. M. Swinnen , Alessandro Olper , Thijs Vandemoortele

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1786347

关键词: AgricultureAgricultural policyForeign policy analysisPoliticsPolicy analysisPolicy studiesCommercial policyEconomicsPolitical economy

摘要: We study the political economy of instrument choice in agricultural and food policies. After a review historical evolution European price trade policy instruments since 1880, we develop model choice. The key predictions suggest rational explanation patterns, based on trade-off between different cost components policies, internal external constraints. An empirical analysis supports main theoretical model. find that GATT/WTO agreement had significant impact.

参考文章(72)
Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law ,(1988)
Michele Polo, Electoral Competition and Political Rents SSRN Electronic Journal. ,(1998) , 10.2139/SSRN.143851
Jenny Minier, Josh Ederington, Why Tariffs, not Subsidies? A Search for Stylized Facts Social Science Research Network. ,(2005) , 10.2139/SSRN.271149
Giovanni Maggi, Andres Rodriguez-Clare, Import Peneteration and the Politics of Trade Protection Social Science Research Network. ,(1998)
Mancur Olson, Robert T. Golembiewski, The Logic of Collective Action ,(1965)
Giovanni Maggi, Giovanni Maggi, Giovanni Maggi, Andres Rodriguez-Clare, Andres Rodriguez-Clare, A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements Social Science Research Network. ,(2005)
Robert W. Staiger, Robert W. Staiger, Robert W. Staiger, Kyle Bagwell, Kyle Bagwell, An Economic Theory of GATT Social Science Research Network. ,(1997)
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations ,(1982)
Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effect of Constitutions MIT Press. ,(2003)