摘要: We analyze the relation between intensity of electoral competition and dissipation political rents. In a model with perfectly informed heterogeneous voters, two candidates commit to platforms under majority voting winner-takes-all rule. If proposed tax revenues exceed cost public good, winning candidate retains surplus (political rents). The are uncertain about voters' preferences. they do not know mean distribution (aggregate uncertainty), is relaxed rents positive. then consider some extensions, as ideological positioning, increasing number imperfect commitment announced policies.
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