作者: Roger Wattenhofer , Stefan Schmid , Thomas Locher , Patrick Moor
DOI:
关键词: Order (exchange) 、 Computer security 、 Download 、 Incentive 、 BitTorrent 、 Quality (business) 、 BitTorrent protocol encryption 、 Free riding 、 Computer science 、 Swarm behaviour 、 Internet privacy
摘要: While it is well-known that BitTorrent vulnerable to selfish behavior, this paper demonstrates even entire files can be downloaded without reciprocating at all in BitTorrent. To end, we present BitThief, a free riding client never contributes any real data. First, show simple tricks suffice order achieve high download rates, the absence of seeders. We also illustrate how peers swarm react various sophisticated attacks. Moreover, our analysis reveals sharing communities—communities originally intended offer downloads good quality and promote cooperation among peers—provide many incentives cheat.