作者: Jack Citrin
DOI: 10.1086/NTJ41863164
关键词: Political economy 、 Economics 、 California Proposition 13 、 Government spending 、 Government revenue 、 Revenue 、 Opposition (politics) 、 Public opinion 、 Economic policy 、 Property tax 、 Public finance
摘要: THE consume public's government readiness programs to demand is and unconsume s understandably greater than its willingness pay for them. Recognizing this, public officials typically downplay the connection between taxing spending cast about sources of revenue that are palatable is, politically harmless even if inequitable or inefficient. From politician's perspective, ideal tax one neither seen nor felt, only paid (Meltsner, 1974). Indeed, recent research shows it reliance on visible taxes finance services rather sheer magnitude burden rate growth best explains intensity "tax revolts" in affluent democracies (Wilensky, 1976). Thus not surprising California a sharp seemingly inexorable rise highly property tax, particularly during time growing inflationary pressure real disposable income, caused popular outcry culminated overwhelming victory Proposition 13. The success JarvisGann initiative quickly spawned variety imitative proposals other states thrust issue limiting onto top nation's political agenda. No disputes passage 13 expressed collective preference lower taxes. Such certainty dissolves, however, when attempts define voters' intentions more precise terms. For example, revolt" aimed at amount paid, form taxation, distribution among different social classes? Are anti-tax anti-spending sentiments likely endure, will they recede as troubled economic circumstances improve? how closely linked opposition current taxation attitudes gov-